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TAX PLANNING ENHANCED BY
TAX-FREE EXCHANGE PROVISIONS
By THOMAS R. FRANTZ
Like-Kind Exchanges
The recent reduction in the effective tax rate applicable to long-term
capital gains" will inevitably reduce the incentive for tax-free exchanges
in those circumstances in which the gain realized is modest and the
corresponding tax is relatively minor. Nevertheless, tax-free exchanges
will continue as important planning tools in many circumstances, par-
ticularly in situations presenting significant gains and those in which
a sale of property would otherwise trigger a significant amount of de-
preciation recapture.
Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code is one of several excep-
tions to the general rule that a taxpayer must recognize gain or loss on
the sale or exchange of property. In enacting this provision, Congress
intended to avoid (i) the recognition of "theoretical" gains and losses
where property received in exchange is substantially a continuation
of the taxpayer's investment in the property transferred, and (ii) the
necessity of valuing property in "thousands of horse trades" which
occur each year.?
Under the provisions of Section 1031, when property held for
productive use in a trade or business or for investment is exchanged
solely for property of a like kind to be held for either such purpose,
no gain or loss is recognized. If an exchange qualifies, the application
of the Section is mandatory, and non-recognition of gain or loss will
result regardless of a taxpayer's intent.3 Because of the mandatory appli-
cation of the statute together with the fact that few natural situations
exist for the reciprocal exchange of like-kind property, the importance
of careful planning cannot be understated.
REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 1031
Purpose
-With respect to the purpose requirement of Section 1031, it is es-
sential that both the property exchanged and the property received be
held by the taxpayer "for productive use in trade or business or for
'Act Section 402, amending Sections 57(a)(9), 170(e)(I) and 1202, Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended (hereinafter cited only by Code section). Gen-
erally, the Act reduces the maximum effective rate at which long-term capital gains
are taxed from 49.5% to 28%.
2 H. R. Rept. No. 704, Revenue Act of 1934, 73d Cong. 2d Sess., 1939t1 (pt. 2)
C.B. 554, 564.
3 U. S. v. Vardine, 305 F.2d 60, 62-2 USTC 9624 (2nd Cir. 1962). Caveat: a
little non-recognition property can cause a large loss to be disallowed. See, e.g.,
Rev. Rul. 65-155, 1965-1 C.B. 356, where qualifying property constituted only 20%
of the property received, whereas non-qualifying property (primarily installment
notes) constituted 80% of the property received.
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investment." ' Whether property is held for the proper purposes is a
factual determination made with respect to the taxpayer's intent and
the use made of the property at the time of the exchange. For example,
the Service in Revenue Ruling 57-244 5 held that unimproved property
qualified as property held for "investment" where the taxpayer's intent
at the time of purchase to construct a residence on it was abandoned
in favor of an investment intent. Although the use of the property
at the time of the exchange is generally the controlling factor, business
property may qualify notwithstanding that it laid idle for a period of time
before the exchange or that its business use had been destroyed by
circumstances beyond the taxpayer's control.,
Specifically excluded from the definition of "qualifying property"
are stock in trade, property held primarily for sale, stocks, bonds, notes,
choses in action, certificates of trust or beneficial interest or other securi-
ties or evidence of indebtedness or interest. Note that there is omitted
from the "property held primarily for sale" exclusion the qualifying
language, "to customers in the ordinary course of [a taxpayer's] trade
or business," of Sections 1221 and 1231. "Primarily" as used in the
context of Section 1031 means "of first importance," so that property
may be excluded from its application, notwithstanding that it is not
held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.7 There-
fore, if the property received in exchange is to be sold, rather than
retained for a qualifying purpose, the transaction does not qualify
as a like-kind exchange. If property is sold too soon after it is acquired,
it will be presuined that the taxpayer's intent at the time of the acquisi-
tion was to sell the property.
The same rule applies where property is exchanged in an otherwise
tax-free transfer, too soon after it is acquired, or acquired in an other-
wise tax-free manner for the purpose of a qualifying exchange. For
example, the acquisition or construction of property for purposes of
exchanging it may result in the recognition of any realized gain or loss
to the taxpayer acquiring or constructing such property on the grounds
that he never held the property for productive use or for investment.8
4Section 103 1(a). Note that the determination of whether property is held for
a qualifying purpose is made separately for each party to the exchange, so that
one party may qualify for Section 1031 treatment, while the other party may not,
Rev. Rul. 66-209, 1966-2 C.B. 299, Rev. Rul. 75-291, 1974-2 C.B. 332.
5 1957-1 C.B. 247.
6See, e.g., Alamo Broadcasting Co., 15 T.C. 534 (1950), acq. 1951-1 C.B. 1;
Independent Brick Co., 11 B.T.A. 862 (1928).7 Bernard, 26 TCM 858, T.C. Memo 1967-16. The question of whether property
was held "primarily" for sale is one of intent to be determined from all relevant
surrounding facts and circumstances. See, e.g., Wm F. Horsting, 5 T.C.M. 421
(1946).
8 Rev. Rul. 75-291, 1975-2 C.B. 332; see also Juhl Smith, 34 TCM 704, T.C.
Memo 1975-153 (1975), aff'd 537 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1975); see also Century
Electric Co. v. Comm'r, 192 F.2d 155, 51-2 USTC 9482 (8th Cir. 1951), aff'g.
15 TC 581 (1950), cert. den. 342 U.S. 954 (1952).
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Further, the Service has denied like-kind exchange treatment to a tax-
payer who otherwise completed a qualifying exchange because he
immediately transferred the acquired property to a controlled corpora-
tion, notwithstanding that the first transfer qualified under Section 1031.
Again, the Service's rationale was that the taxpayer failed to hold the
property acquired in exchange for a qualifying purpose.9 Although the
ruling is technically correct, the result does not appear to carry out
the legislative intent in Sections 1031 and 351, prompting suggestions
of legislative action.'0
Similarly, the Service has held unqualified an exchange in which
the taxpayer received property in a distribution from a corporation
pursuant to a Section 333 liquidation and immediately exchanged the
property for otherwise qualifying like-kind property owned by an un-
related party." According to the Service, the reason for which the
distributed property was held by the corporation prior to liquidation
could not be attributed to the taxpayer; therefore, he was deemed to
have held the property for purposes of exchange rather than for produc-
tive use or for investment. Although the rulings clearly indicate the
existence of a trap for the unwary, the "trap" may be used to a tax-
payer's benefit. A taxpayer apparently may elect whether he desires
to recognize a gain or loss on an otherwise qualifying exchange by trans-
ferring property to or from a controlled entity, such as a corporation,
partnership, trust, etc., immediately before or after an exchange.
Like Kind
In order to qualify for nonrecognition treatment, the property ex-
changed by a taxpayer must be of "like-kind" to the property received.
"Like-kind" refers to the nature or character of property as opposed to
its grade or quality and is broadly construed. Thus, all real estate,
whether improved or unimproved, qualifies as like-kind since the im-
provement of such property relates only to its grade or quality. 12 In
determining whether the "nature and character" of property are com-
parable, consideration must be given to such things as the respective
interests in the physical properties, the nature of the title conveyed,
the rights of the parties in the property and the duration of the interest.18
In structuring a transaction, care must be taken to insure that the
"nature and character" of the properties exchanged and received is the
same under state law. For example, if under local law mineral interests
are regarded as interests in real property, they are considered to be of
9 Rev. Rul. 75-292, 1975-2 C.B. 333.
10See, e.g., "Comment, Analysis of Revenue Ruling 75-292: A Proposal to
Allow the Combined Use of Sections 1031 and 351 Without Destroying the Tax-
Free Status of Each," 17 William & Mary Law Review 599 (1976).
11 Rev. Rul. 77-337, I.R.B. 1977-38.
'
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(b).
is Koch, 71 TC No. 5 (October 23, 1978).
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the same nature and character as a fee interest in land and may be
exchanged for a fee interest in land.1' Surprisingly, the Service recently
argued, unsuccessfully, that the exchange of fee interests in real estate
estate did not qualify where the property received was subject to a 99-
year lease. The property received constituted two separate rights, the
Service contended, neither of which qualified as like-kind property with
a fee interest in real estate: (1) the right of a reversion at the expiration
of the lease having nominal value and (2) the right to an "income
stream" represented by rent to be received under the lease.15 The Tax
Court responded that these rights did not, in fact, constitute separate and
distinct items of property; rather they were a part of the bundle of
rights incident to the ownership of the fee.
There is considerable question whether improvements to property
already owned by a taxpayer constitute like-kind property with im-
proved or unimproved real estate. The Service believes they do not and
has ruled that the investment of proceeds from an involuntary con-
version of land held for investment purposes in the construction of a
building, storm drains, a water system and road on land already owned
by the taxpayer at the date of the conversion, does not qualify as a
like-kind replacement of the converted property within the meaning
of Section 1033(g)."6 The Service rationalizes that land, improved or
unimproved, is of a different nature or character than improvements on
land. Where this has been litigated, however, at least one district court
has disagreed with the Service. In Davis v. United States,' the Hawaiian
District Court refused to follow the Service's position, holding that the
investment of the proceeds from the involuntary conversion of unim-
proved land in the installation of storm drains on land already owned
by the taxpayers qualified as a like-kind replacement under Section
1033(g). The court's decision was based on a finding that the improve-
"4Crichton, 122 F.2d 181, 41-2 USTC 9638 (8th Cir. 1941), aff'g. 42 B.T.A.
490, acq. 1952-1 C.B. 2. See also Win. Flemming, 24 T.C. 818 (1955), rev'd on
other issues, 241 F.2d 78, 57-1 USTC 9363 (1957) (mineral interests may be
exchanged, if the nature and character of the rights conveyed are substantially
equal under state law); Rev. Rul. 55-749, 1955-2 C.B. 295 (perpetual water rights
are "like kind" with respect to a fee simple interest in land); see, however, M.H.S.
Co., Inc. (35 TCM 733 [1976], T.C. Memo 1976-165), aff'd (6th Cir. 1978) (ajoint venture was really a partnership under state law; therefore, the taxpayer's in-
terest constituted personal property and the reinvestment of condemnation proceeds
did not qualify under Section 103 3[g]).
15 Koch, supra, note 13.
16 Revenue Ruling 67-255, 1967-2 C.B. 270. Note that the definition of "like
kind" under Section 1033 (g) is the same as its definition under Section 1031.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(g)-1(a). See also Rev. Rul. 76-390, 1976-2 C.B. 243 (motel
constructed on land already owned by taxpayer with condemnation proceeds from
land not like kind); Rev. Rul. 76--39, 1976-2 C.B. 243 (commercial building to
replace farm land didn't qualify); Letter Ruling 7811056.
'7 411 F.Supp. 964, 76-1 USTC 9418 (D.C. Hawaii 1976), appeal pending to
the 9th Circuit.
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ments made by the taxpayers represented a substantial continuation
of their prior commitment of capital, the underpinning of Section 1031.
As a partnership interest is personal property under the laws of all
the states, the exchange of real property for an interest in a partner-
ship owning real property does not qualify under Section 1031. Personal
property and real property are not of the same nature and character.
This presents a "trap" for the unwary in that a joint venture, and in
some cases, a tenancy-in-common may constitute a partnership under
state law, resulting in the unintended taxation of a taxpayer who ex-
changes such an interest for real property. However, if a tenancy-in-
common does not constitute a partnership interest under state law, the
exchange of an interest in such tenancy for a full fee interest in qualify-
ing property will be governed by Section 1031. '
The Service and courts agree that a general partnership interest and
a limited partnership interest are not like-kind property. 19 They disagree,
however, as to whether interests in two general partnerships may con-
stitute like-kind property. In Revenue Ruling 78-135,20 the Service held
that a general partnership interest constituted an equity interest coming
within the ambit of Section 1031 (a)'s parenthetical listing of ineligible
property. The Service maintains that its holding is in conformity with
Section 741, which requires the transferor-partner to recognize gain
or loss on a sale or exchange of a partnership interest. However, the
Service's extension of the parenthetical listing to include equity interests
of all types, other than the direct ownership of the underlying property,
seems unwarranted and ignores the issues of whether the underlying
assets or business of the partnership are of like kind. Further, it fails
to mention the cases which have held that the exchange of general part-
nership interests may qualify under Section 1031 and does not address
the question of whether a partnership should be regarded as an aggregate
or entity under Section 1031. The Tax Court, in the Estate of Meyer, 2
rejected an argument by the Service that general partnership interests
were choses in action, specifically excluded under Section 1031[a];
rather, the court extended nonrecognition to the exchange of general
partnership interests in different partnerships where both partnerships
owned like-kind property.
Exchange
The form in which a transaction is cast is critical, in that an
"exchange" must exist. An "exchange" as used in Section 1031(a) is
18 Rev. Rul. 73-476, 1973-2 C.B. 300. Hence, like-kind exchanges may generally
be used to split up investors who hold property as tenants-in-common and who
desire to part ways.
19 Estate of Meyer, 58 T.C. 311 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 503 F.2d 556, 74-2
USTC 9676 (9th Cir. 1974).
20 1978-5 I.R.B. 12.
21 Supra, note 19, nonacq. I.R.B. 1975-7, 6; see Miller v. Comm'r, 63-2 USTC
9606 (D.C. Ind. 1963).
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defined as a reciprocal transfer of property as opposed to a transfer
of property for money consideration, or the right to receive such con-
sideration.2 2 Thus, a sale of property, promptly followed by a rein-
vestment, does not qualify notwithstanding the taxpaper's intent.2 Note,
however, that under Section 1031(b), non-qualifying property, or
"boot", may be received or transferred. Although gain realized will be
recognized to the extent of boot received, losses are never recognized
on qualifying property in transactions falling within Section 1031, not-
withstanding the receipt of boot.
Although taxpayers have from time to time encountered difficulties
with all the requirements of Section 1031, the "exchange" requirement
has undoubtedly created the most problems. A straight "exchange"
causes little difficulty. Most of the problems are presented in situations
involving delayed exchanges, prior acquisitions of exchange property,
multi-party exchanges and in connection with sale-leasebacks. The
discussion of these areas of concern will follow a discussion of other
general principles.
Boot, Basis, Mortgages and Holding Period
As noted, property qualifying under Section 1031 may be exchanged
even though money or other non-qualifying property is received. Where
boot is received, however, gain recognized is limited to the amount
of money and the fair market value of non-qualified property received.,
In computing the recognized gain, money paid out in connection with
an exchange, such as commissions and closing costs, is offset against
boot received and may, to the extent it exceeds the boot, be added
in computing the basis of acquired property.2 5
The exchange of encumbered property requires careful planning. If
the taxpayer transfers encumbered property, whether the liability of the
taxpayer is assumed or the property is taken subject to the liability, the
taxpayer is considered to have received boot equal to such liability.26
In the event of reciprocal liabilities, the amount of liability which the tax-
payer assumes, or takes the property subject to, is offset against the
consideration received in that form; that is, the encumbrances are
"netted." In such case, the party exchanging the property subject to
the greater liability will recognize the gain to the extent of the difference
22 See, e.g., Bloomington Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Comm'r, 189 F.2. 14, 16,
51-1 USTC 9320 (7th Cir. 1951).
23 See, e.g., Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. U. S., 320 F.2d 333, 337, 63-2 USTC
9623 (4th Cir. 1963); Juhl Smith, supra, note 8 (appellate court).
24 § 1031(b); note that if a taxpayer receives some unqualified property in a
qualifying exchange, payable in installments (notes), he may elect to report the
recognized gain on the installment basis (Section 453) if the transaction otherwise
qualified. Re. Rul. 65-155, 1965-1 C.B. 356.
25 Rev. Rul. 72-456, 1972-2 C.B. 468.
26 § 1031(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-2.
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between the liabilities. Provided, however, that if consideration is given
in the form of cash or other property by the taxpayer transferring prop-
erty subject to the greater liability, such cash or other property given
is offset against the difference in mortgages. This, in turn, creates a
problem for the taxpayer surrending the property subject to the lesser
mortgage, in that consideration received in other forms, such as cash
or other property are treated as boot received for purposes of Section
1031(b) notwithstanding the taxpayer's assumption of liabilities .2
These rules indicate the need for careful planning in order to avoid
unintended results. For example, suppose A and B wish to exchange
properties, each of which have a basis of $20,000 and a value of
$100,000. A's property is encumbered by a $50,000 deed of trust, and
B's property is encumbered by a $40,000 deed of trust. The parties
contemplate that the properties will be exchanged, subject to the exist-
ing deeds of trust, with an appropriate adjustment for the $10,000
difference.
The parties may carry out the transaction in three different ways,
each of which result in a different tax treatment. A may pay B the
$10,000 in cash; A may prepay $10,000 on his deed of trust note;
or B may refinance, borrowing an additional $10,000. If B receives
$10,000 cash from A, B will recognize gain to that extent under the rules
of Section 1031 (b), as the $10,000 cash is not offset by the additional
liabilities assumed by B. On the other hand, if B prepays $10,000,
neither party will recognize gain on the exchange because the liabilities
will be netted. In this regard, B may receive $10,000 in cash, subject to
the obligation to apply such payment to a reduction of the liability,
thereby becoming a mere conduit for A's prepayment. 8 Careful drafting,
however, is required in such a transaction as B must, in fact, be a mere
conduit. Lastly, and perhaps the best alternative if second mortgage
money is reasonably priced, is for B to borrow an additional $10,000
to be assumed by A in the transaction. In such circumstances, no gain
should be recognized by B.
A taxpayer qualifying for Section 1031 treatment may also recognize
taxable income from depreciation recapture. For example, in an exchange
of Section 1250 property, a taxpayer will recognize gain to the extent
of the greater of the gain recognized on the exchange; or the gain that
would normally be determined under the rules of Section 1250, less
the fair market value of Section 1250 property acquired in the exchange.
The second limitation often causes problems, particularly in connection
with the exchange of an improved parcel of real estate for unimproved
2 7 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(b)-l(c); see Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-2 Ex. (2).
28 North Shore Bus Co. v. United States, 143 F.2d 114, 44-1 USTC 9345 (2d
Cir. 1944), aff'g 1 TCM 493; but see Coleman v. United States 180 F.2d 758,
50-1 USTC 9254 [8th Cir. 1950], aff'g 8 TCM 352 (for the opposite result
where B is not a mere "conduit").
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land.2 9 The party receiving the land may be subject to significant taxes
if the improved parcel has built-in recapture potential. To the extent
Section 1250 recapture is not recognized, it is earmarked for future rec-
ognition. For this purpose only, the holding period for such recapture
commences on the date of the exchange.
Lastly, Section 1031 (d) provides that the basis of property received
in a qualifying exchange is equal to the adjusted basis of the qualified
and non-qualified property transferred, decreased by the amount of any
money received and increased by any gain, or decreased by any loss
recognized on the exchange. If the taxpayer receives boot in the form
of non-qualified property the basis must first be allocated to the boot
received, to the extent of its fair market value, and the remainder, if
any, to the qualifying property.30 If more than one qualifying property
is received, the total recomputed basis is allocated in proportion to
the relative fair market values of such properties.
Although the basis rules are fairly straightforward, there is some
room for planning. For example, the requirement that the basis of
qualified property received be allocated among such properties in
proportion to their relative values may result in higher or lower deprecia-
tion deductions due to differing ratios of depreciable versus non-depreci-
able assets. Further, the useful lives of the exchange property may
vary resulting in a more or less rapid write-off.
Delayed Receipt
An investor may wish to take advantage of a favorable offer to acquire
his property using the like-kind exchange provisions, but may not have
located suitable exchange property at the time of closing. In such cases
the question arises whether he may deed his property subject to the
purchaser's obligation to acquire and convey to him qualifying property
in the future. Such a case was recently reviewed by a federal district
court.
Though the result has been criticized, an exchange of property for
a promise to deliver like-kind property in the future was held by the
Oregon District Court in Starker v. United States2 not to qualify for
non-recognition treatment under Section 1031. In Starker, the taxpayers
deeded their property to a purchaser pursuant to an agreement requir-
ing the purchaser to acquire and deed to the taxpayer like-kind property
from time-to-time having a total value equal to the agreed value of
the property exchanged. The agreement further provided that if similar
property having a value equal to the exchange value was not conveyed
29 § 1250(d)(4); see Treas. Reg. § 1.1250-3(d)(6) if the property consists of
a mixture of § 1250 and non-Section 1250 property; see also Section 1245(b) (4);
Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-4(d)(1);Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-4(d)(2), example 1.3 0 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-1(c).
3' Rev. Rul. 68-36, 1968-1 C.B. 357.
32 432 F.Supp. 864, 77-2 USTC 9512 (D.C. Ore. 1977).
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to the taxpayers prior to a certain date, the taxpayers were obligated to
accept cash. In the interim, the taxpayers had no control over the cash
used by the purchaser to purchase the exchange properties and could not
require cash in lieu of property.
In fact, otherwise qualifying properties were transferred to the tax-
payers prior to the date on which cash was required to be paid if
adequate conveyances were not made. The district court originally
held the transaction qualified under Section 1031, - but later withdrew
its opinion, reversing its prior holding. The court's decision is sketchy
and questionable as the taxpayers appear to have complied with the
technical requirements of Section 1031 and met its underlying rationale
of continuity of investment. Given this adverse precedent, however,
taxpayers pursuing a Starker-type factual pattern can expect a challenge.
One's exposure to a successful Service challenge can be reduced by
structuring a delayed exchange along the lines present in the J. H.
Baird Publishing Co.34 case. In Baird, the Tax Court held that a tax-
payer who retained the use of property rent-free after transferring legal
title pending the future receipt of qualifying exchange property qualified
for Section 1031 treatment under the surrounding facts and circum-
stances which were found to be consistent with an "exchange." The
Service has acquiesced in this decision.
In reviewing the Baird and the Starker decisions, the only apparent
distinguishing fact is that the taxpayer in Baird retained possession
of the transferred property until the exchange property was deeded
to him. The Tax Court characterized this retention as a retention of
beneficial ownership, reasoning that the exchange took place not when
legal title was conveyed, but when the beneficial ownership was re-
linquished. It has been suggested that this distinction is without merit,
and that the real basis for the Baird decision lies in the application of
the step transaction doctrine. If this is correct, the Starker decision
should not be followed. Until such time as the matter is clarified, how-
ever, a taxpayer who deeds property should retain some of his "bundle
of rights" in the property until he receives a conveyance of like-kind
property. In the alternative, the taxpayer should structure the trans-
action as a conditional sale or a lease purchase agreement.
Prior Purchase or Option
The taxpayer must not have already purchased the exchange property.
In Juhl Smith 3 5 the taxpayer attempted a three-party exchange after
he had purchased the exchange parcel (Parcel A). To avoid capital gain
on the appreciated like-kind property (Parcel B), he sold Parcel A
33 75-1 USTC 9443 (D.C. Ore. 1975).
3'39 T.C. 608 (1962), acq. 1963-2 C.B.4; see, generally, Campbell, "Real
Estate Investment Planning Enhanced by the Code's Tax-Free Exchange Pro-
visions," 6 Taxation for Lawyers 16 (July-August, 1977).
35 Supra, note 8.
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to a third party for its purchase price, and then exchanged Parcel
A for Parcel B. The Tax Court applied the step transaction doctrine,
treating the exchange as a sale. Apparently, the taxpayer did not
show that the original purchase of Parcel A was part of an overall
plan of exchange. Because the Tax Court left open the question of
whether the result would have been different if the taxpayer's original
purchase of Parcel A had been pursuant to the same plan as the sub-
sequent exchange, the case has been criticized. However, alternatives
exist in the form of three-party exchanges which have been approved
by the courts and the Service. Hence, the Smith fact pattern should be
avoided.
If a taxpayer holds an option on property a prospective purchaser
wishes to acquire, and acquires that property with the proceeds of a
loan from the prospective purchaser for the purpose of exchanging the
property for like-kind property, the Service may argue that the tax-
payer has in substance sold his option. However, the Tax Court has
found in such a fact situation that the advance of funds by the prospec-
tive purchaser constituted a loan ag opposed to "boot," and the trans-
action qualified as an exchange.3 6 Although the Service has acquiesced
in the loan treatment, it has not acquiesced in the Court's holding under
Section 1031. The Service's position remains that such a transaction
constitutes a sale of the option.
Sale-Leasebacks
For bona fide business reasons, or to recognize a loss, a taxpayer
may wish to sell his property and simultaneously lease it back for a
long term, so as not to be deprived of its use. In the usual case, the
taxpayer will receive cash for his property and concurrently enter
into a lease with the purchaser. If the sale results in a loss, the Service
may argue that the transaction constituted an exchange, particularly
if the lease he acquires is for a term of thirty years or longer, including
optional renewal periods.3 7 Therefore, the Service contends that the
taxpayer is not entitled to deduct his loss, and the cash he received
for the property is treated as boot.
If the sale of the property is at fair market value, the rental is at
the market rate, and bona fide business reasons exist for the sale and
the lease-back, however, the separate and independent nature of the
86 124 Front Street, Inc. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 6 (1975), acq. and nonacq., 1976-2
C.B.2; see also Cary H. Everett, 37 T.C.M. 274, T.C. Memo 1978-53 (1978).
37 A lease of 30 years or longer and a fee interest are deemed like-kind property.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c)(2); Rev. Rul. 66-209, 1966-2 C.B. 299; optional
renewal periods are included in determining if the 30-year test is met. Century
Electric Co. v. Comm'r, supra (note 8); R. & I. Furniture Co., 20 T.C. 857
(1973), acq. 1954-1 C.B. 6; Letter Ruling 7801004; Rev. Rul. 78-72, 1978-9,
I.R.B. 18.
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transactions should be recognized. 8 Although the test requires a factual
determination, sale treatment is more difficult to sustain if the lease
term, including options, exceeds thirty years. Cases in this area are more
difficult to reconcile and are often conflicting. In Century Electric Co.,"9
a ninety-five-year lease was held to be part of an exchange, as the
Eighth Circuit determined that the position of the taxpayer had not
changed in that he had not liquidated his investment. Although there was
no finding that the rent or the sales price equaled fair market value,
there was some evidence to support the conclusion that the price was
less than market.
In Jordan Marsh Co.,4 0 the Second Circuit held that a sale and lease-
back for a term of more than thirty years did not constitute a like-kind
exchange. In so holding, the court noted that the business arrangements
were reasonable and that non-tax motives existed. The Service, however,
considers the transaction a like-kind exchange and will not follow
Marsh. A similar result was reached by the Third Circuit in Leslie Co.
v. U. S.41 In Leslie, a taxpayer constructed a building for $3,187,000
and sold it to an unrelated insurance company for $2,400,000, and then
leased it back pursuant to a prearranged contract for a term of thirty
years, with two ten-year optional renewal periods. Following the trans-
action, the taxpayer deducted a $787,000 loss on the "sale." The Tax
Court agreed with the taxpayer, holding that the property had been
sold. The court based its decision on a finding that the sales price equaled
fair market value, even though acquisition and construction costs ex-
ceeded $3,000,000, and that the rental paid under the lease was fair
rental. Because the court believed that the sales price constituted the
fair market value of the property, it determined that no other considera-
tion was paid to the taxpayer.
Three-Party Exchanges
Although the theory of multi-party exchanges is not difficult, one
must pay meticulous attention to the proper sequence, form and docu-
mentation. Generally, these transactions follow one of three formats, all
38 Standard Envelope Mfg. Co. (15 T.C. 41 [1950] acq., 1951-2 C.B. 4), and
May Department Stores, Inc. (16 T.C. 547 [1951], acq., 1951-2 C.B. 3). See
also Capri, Inc., 65 T.C. 162 (the independent significance of a sale and 10-year
lease between related entities was recognized where the transaction was for a
valid business purpose).
39 Supra; note 8.
40 269 F.2d 453, 59-2 USTC 1941 (2nd Cir. 1959), rev'g 16 T.C.M. 1094,
nonacq. Rev. Rul. 60-43, 1960-1 C.B. 678.
41 Caveat, note that the Court, using a step-transaction analysis, could have
found that for a net cost of $787,000 the taxpayer acquired a leasehold interest
for 30 years to be amortized over that period. See Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.
v. U. S., 104 Ct. Ct. 837-74-1 USTC 9389 (1973).
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of which involve the same scenario. A prospective purchaser (B)
wishes to purchase taxpayer's (A's) property, but A does not wish to
sell because of adverse tax consequences. However, he is willing to trade
for property owned by a prospective Seller (C), and C is willing to
sell for B's money. In some cases, a fourth party is used to sell the tax-
payer's property and apply the proceeds to the acquisition of suitable
exchange property. If either transaction is properly structured, it will
qualify under Section 1031(a). However, the four-party transaction
should be avoided if possible because it is more cumbersome and some-
what more dangerous. The Service may argue the fourth party is
taxpayer's agent, and the chances of taxpayer error are greater.
One method of accomplishing a tax-free exchange under such
circumstances is for A to convey his property to B, who in turn transfers
cash to C, and C transfers his property to A. Under this format, all
parties to the transaction must be known at the time of the exchange.
Escrow arrangements are usually used, with A and C depositing deeds,
and B depositing the money consideration. The Tax Court has ap-
proved the use of escrows in such arrangements,'" and the Service as
approved the use of unilateral transfers, notwithstanding the lack of
reciprocity between A and C.
In Revenue Ruling 57-244,' lots were transferred among three
taxpayers with A receiving C's lot, C receiving B's lot, and B receiving
A's lot. In holding that the transaction qualified, the Service cited
with apparent approval the Fifth Circuit's decision in W. D. Haden Co.
v. Commissioner, a four-party exchange." In Haden a taxpayer ex-
changed property with a broker. The broker had purchased the property
exchanged for the taxpayer's property from a third party, with the
proceeds of the sale of the taxpayer's property to a fourth party. The
taxpayer was held to have exchanged one property for another, notwith-
standing the lack of a reciprocal transfer of property between the tax-
payer and the third party. Apparently, all that is now required under
Section 1031 is that, as an end result of an agreement, property be
received by the taxpayer for the property he transferred.
Under the second format, A and C exchange their properties, fol-
lowed by B's purchase of A's former property from C. Here the
Service may argue that C is acting merely as A's agent for sale, re-
ceiving A's property for delivery to B, and B's money consideration for
purposes of acquiring the property from A. However, as long as C
actually takes legal title and beneficial ownership of A's property,
42 See Leslie Q. Coupe, 52 T.C. 394 (1969), acq. 1970-2 C.B. xix (in result
only).
43 1957-1 C.B. 247.
44 165 F.2d 588, 48-1 USTC 9147 (5th Cir. 1948), aff'g in part and rev'g in
part 5 T.C.M. 250 (the role of the prospective purchaser may be passive); see
Franklin B. Biggs, 69 T.C. 905 (1978); Leslie Q. Coupe, supra, note 42.
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whether for himself or as B's agent, A's exchange qualifies under Sec-
tion 103 1.435
Finally, B may acquire C's property for cash, and then exchange it
for A's property. If an exchange is carried out in this manner, the
Service may argue that the substance of the transaction is a sale,
particularly if B fleetingly holds title. Its argument is that the cash
payment to C is in reality the proceeds of A's sale. The courts have
approved this format, however, holding it to be immaterial that B ac-
quired title to C's property solely for purposes of the exchange; pro-
vided the taxpayer is able to establish that (i) he intended and was
obligated only to exchange as opposed to sell; (ii) an exchange actually
occurred between A and B; and (iii) B used his funds to acquire C's
property temporarily for himself.4,
It is somewhat surprising that so many taxpayers have encountered
problems with multi-party exchanges, in view of the relatively liberal
substantive requirements. For example, three-party exchanges are
permitted even if they are structured to reduce taxes. Further, these
transactions will not fail to qualify merely because the taxpayer locates
the exchange property, carries on all negotiations, pays the closing
costs or the purchaser fails to take title, if based on all the facts and
circumstances, the taxpayer is able to show the overall plan con-
sisted of interdependent steps to exchange property under Section 103 1.4
The sequence, form, and documentation requirements are fairly strict,
however, and must be followed with reasonable care in order to ensure
qualification.
As indicated, the prospective purchaser may play a relatively passive
role in the acquisition of the exchange property from C and the com-
pletion of the exchange. None of the courts, however, have gone as
far as the recent Tax Court decision in Biggs.4-3 In Biggs, A orally
agreed to sell his Maryland farm to B for $900,000. As part of such
consideration A was to receive like-kind property. Later, A located
a Virginia farm he wished to receive as exchange property, contracted
in his own name to purchase the Virginia property and assigned the
cohtract to, and advanced money to, a corporation controlled by his
lawyer to allow the corporation to purchase it. Thereafter, B contracted
45Leslie Q. Coupe, supra, note 42 (comparable four-party exchanges); I. H.
Baird Publishing Co., supra, note 34 (property received constructed by C to A's
specifications); Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore, 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935), acq.
XIV-1 C.B. 13 (right to require purchase for cash not exercised).
46See, e.g., Alderson v. Comm'r, 317 F.2d 790, 63-2 USTC 9499 (9th Cir.
1963), rev'g 38 T.C. 215 (1962); see also Rev. Rul. 75-291, 1975-2 C.B. 332; Rev.
Rul. 77-297, 1977-2 C.B. 12; Coastal Terminals, Inc., supra, note 23.
4 7 Biggs, supra, note 44; Coastal Terminals, Inc., supra, note 23. Cases prior to
Biggs nave required that in such cases B should pay the purchase price and at
least fleetingly assume the risk of ownership. Hubert Rutland, 36 T.C.M. 40, T.C.
Memo 1977-8.
48 Supra, note 44.
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to buy the Virginia farm from the corporation by assuming the deeds
of trust thereon, including the deeds of trust securing A's advances.
On the following day, A and B entered into a contract under which A
agreed to convey the Maryland property to B; and B, in consideration
therefor, assigned his right to purchase the Virginia farm to A, and
agreed to pay A $900,000 for the Maryland farm. At closing, A con-
veyed the Maryland farm to B for $900,000 and the corporation con-
veyed the Virginia farm to A, subject to the deed of trust notes totaling
$272,100.
The Tax Court found that under the surrounding circumstances the
conveyance of the Maryland farm to B and the acquisition of the
Virginia farm from the corporation were interdependent parts of an
overall plan, resulting in a qualifying exchange under Section 1031. In
so holding, the court focused on the substance of the transaction, taking
into consideration all steps in the "integrated plan." It also determined
that its result was consonant with the expressed legislative purpose in
that the taxpayer had continued his investment. The fact that A received
the full purchase price of $900,000 did not alter the tax consequences
as the liabilities assumed by A could have been paid by the corporation
prior to closing if B would have contributed $272,100 to the capital
of the corporation. If the liabilities had been paid, A would have
received cash and notes in the amount of $627,900 and the Virginia
farm. The Tax Court noted that such a transaction would certainly have
qualified under Section 1031 and saw no reason to reach a different
result merely because the formal structure of the transaction was differ-
ent.
Perhaps the strongest pro-taxpayer case prior to Biggs involving
a passive purchaser, is the Ninth Circuit's decision in Alderson.46 In
Alderson, A executed an agreement with B for the sale of his property
to B, who made a deposit toward the purchase price in escrow. After
locating suitable exchange property, A and B amended their agreement,
under which B, through the escrow agent, was to acquire like-kind
property from C and exchange it for A's property in lieu of the cash
transaction. B thereafter acquired C's property and exchanged it with
A. Prior to B's purchase of C's property, A not only located suitable
exchange property, but negotiated its purchase and placed a deposit
for it. Further, A contracted for the purchase of C's property under
an agreement which clearly provided for the transfer of the exchange
property to B. Although the Tax Court determined that the transaction
did not qualify under Section 1031, the Ninth Circuit reversed. Ap-
parently the Tax Court held against the Aldersons because they actually
executed the purchase agreements for the exchange property. There
49 Supra, note 40; see also Coastal Terminals, Inc., supra, note 26 (§ 1031
treatment sustained, notwithstanding the taxpayer's conveyance of options to
purchase the exchange property to B so that the exchange could be completed).
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appears to be little to this distinction, however because of the con-
tract's clear provisions that the property be conveyed to B.
The key to a successful multi-party exchange is that the taxpayer
must avoid both the receipt of and the right to receive and control
cash. Carlton v. United States"° is a classic example of a taxpayer's
failing to avoid the receipt of cash. In Carlton, the taxpayer granted
a prospective purchaser an option to purchase its property, but retained
under the option the right to require the purchaser to acquire other
property designated by the taxpayer and exchange such property with
the taxpayer in lieu of the required money consideration. Following the
purchaser's exercise of the option, the taxpayer located suitable exchange
properties and required the purchaser to acquire these properties for
the purpose of exchange. The prospective purchaser contracted to pur-
chase the exchange properties. However, instead of complying with the
required formalities at closing, under which the transaction would no
doubt have qualified, the parties, in order to avoid duplication, did
not comply with the required form of the agreement. Rather, the pro-
spective purchaser assigned to the taxpayer its contract to purchase the
exchange parcels and paid the taxpayer by check the full amount of the
purchase price, with which the taxpayer purchased the exchange
property two days later. On the basis that the taxpayer violated the
strict prohibition against the receipt of or the right to receive and con-
trol cash, the Fifth Circuit held that the transaction failed to qualify
under Section 1031, notwithstanding the obvious intent of the taxpayer
to execute an exchange. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit distinguished
its earlier decision in Haden, noting that the money received by the tax-
payer in Carlton was not earmarked for the purchase of the exchange
property and thus the taxpayer had unrestricted use of it.
Involuntary Conversions
Section 1033 provides for the non-recognition of gain, realized
in the event any property is involuntarily or compulsorily con-
verted either directly into property similar or related in service or use,
or the proceeds of a conversion are used to purchase such property.
Unless the conversion is directly into property similar or related in
service or use, the Section applies only to gains and is elective. 53 In
order to qualify, however, a taxpayer must suffer an event specified in
Section 1033(a) or the threat or imminence thereof. Mere reluctance
on the part of the taxpayer to dispose of property is not sufficient. 52
With one exception, the replacement property must either be property((similar or related in service or use" to the property converted, or stock
50 385 F.2d 258, 67-2 USTC 9625 (5th Cir. 1967).
.1Section 1033(a)(2)(A); see Liant Record, Inc. v. Comm'r, 303 F.2d 326,
62-1 USTC 9494 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'g and rem'g 36 T.C. 244 (1961).
.2 Rev. Rul. 58-11, 1958-1 C.B. 273; Behr-Manning v. United States, 196
F.Supp. 129 (D. Mass 1961).
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sufficient to acquire control of a corporation owning qualifying property.
Illustrating this, Regulation § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(9) provides that no
qualified replacement occurs if the proceeds of unimproved real property
taken in condemnation are invested in improved real estate.
Section 1033(g) is the noted exception which allows under certain
conditions "real property held for productive use in a trade or business
or for investment" to be exchanged or the proceeds to be invested in
"like-kind" property. 53 As noted, the like-kind test is the same test
as the one applied under Section 1031. Accordingly, the acquisition
of controlling interest in stock of a corporation owning "like-kind" prop-
erty will not qualify.
The proceeds of an involuntary conversion generally must be rein-
vested within two years after the close of the first taxable year in
which any part of the gain is realized. The replacement period is
extended to three years for certain conversions of "real property held for
productive use in a trade or business or for investment." 54 Further, the
Secretary, in either case and upon proper application, may extend the
deadline for reinvestment. Likewise, if a taxpayer is able to show
reasonable cause for not having filed an application for extension within
the specified time period, he may obtain an additional reasonable period
after the expiration of the required period.
Very little difficulty is encountered in determining whether property
has been stolen or destroyed. Further, a taxpayer who wishes to claim
the benefits of Section 1033 has an easier task than a taxpayer who
desires to claim a casualty loss as the "suddenness" requirement of
Section 165 does not apply. For example, the Service has held that
the destruction over a period of years by salt water seepage qualified
as an involuntary conversion.5 5 Somewhat more difficulty is encountered,
however, in showing that property was involuntarily or compulsorily
converted as a result of seizure, requisition or condemnation, as the tax-
payer must show a "taking" in the strict common law sense; that is,
one that is compensable under the United States Constitution. A property
interest must be taken or destroyed by a governmental unit for a public
purpose.56 Therefore, a sale by a taxing authority of real estate owned
by several individuals as tenants-in-common in order to satisfy a tax
lien arising from the failure of one party to pay his proportionate share
of taxes on the property does not qualify. 57
Even more problems are encountered in determining if property is
53 Section 1033(g) (seizure, requisition, condemnation or threat or imminence
thereof).54 Section 1033(a)(2)(B); proposed Reg. § 1.1033(f).
55 Rev. Rul. 66-334, 1966-2 C.B. 302; Rev. Rul. 59-102, 1959-1 C.B. 200.
56Behr-Manning Corp v. United States, supra, note 52.
5 Rev. Rul. 77-370, 1977-2 C.B. 306; see Letter Rul. 77390392; Rev. Rul.
57-314, 1957-2 C.B. 423 (condemnation of rental property as unfit for human
habitation); S. E. Ponticos, Inc., 40 T.C. 60 (1963) (failure by governmental
authorities to grant requested changes to existing structures).
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converted under the "threat or imminence" of a seizure, requisition or
condemnation. The Service's view is that "threat or imminence" exists
if the taxpayer has received notification by an authorized public official
that a governmental body has decided to acquire his property and if
he has reasonable grounds to believe that such taking will occur if
he does not voluntarily sell his property. 8 Newspaper stories or a
purported quote by a public official that certain property is desirable
does not constitute a sufficient threat.39 Further, a threat to one of
two properties is not a sufficient threat to the other 0 unless, perhaps,
the properties constitute an economic unit. The courts are somewhat
more liberal, however. For example, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia has held that a threat exists if a taxpayer reasonably
believes that the threat to condemn is present, the authority to condemn
exists or is readily obtainable, and the sale is made because of the
threat."' Regardless of which test is applied, it is important to document
the threat because Section 1033(a) (2) (B) permits a replacement
to be made prior to the taking if it occurs after the threat. In such
cases, of course, the replacement property must be held by the taxpayer
at the time of conversion or sale.
If a governmental authority condemns only a part of a taxpayer's
property, he may sell the remainder to a private party and the pro-
ceeds of both sales may be reinvested under Section 1031 if the tax-
payer is able to show that both parts constitute one economic unit.
In order to meet this test, it must be shown that condemnation of a
portion of the property rendered it impractical to continue the tax-
payer's business on the remainder. In Harry G. Masser," a taxpayer
owned a freight terminal and vacant lots directly across the street.
The lots were used to provide parking space and were a substantial
determinent of the profits from the freight terminal business. The
taxpayer sold the freight terminal after the lots were condemned be-
cause he was unable to obtain replacement lots. The proceeds of the
sale and the condemnation of the lots were expended for a similar
terminal building and parking facilities in another locale. The Tax
Court, in holding that the taxpayer's reinvestment of the combined
proceeds qualified under Section 1033, cited the inadequacy of avail-
able lots for use in his business, the fact that the lots and terminal were
"acquired for the purpose of being used, and were used... as an eco-
nomic unit" and the apparent fact that the continuation of the business
in the terminal without the lots was not practical.
58 Rev. Rul. 63-221, 1963-2 C.B. 332; Rev. Rul. 74-8 1974-1 C.B. 200 (the
sale of property to an agent of a municipality who discloses his principal that has
the authority to obtain the power of eminent domain if necessary constitutes an
involuntary conversion under § 1033).
59 Rev. Rul. 58-557, 1958-2 C.B. 402.
60 Rev. Rul. 69-53, 1969-1 C.B. 199.
61 Richmond Hotels, Inc. v. United States, 75-2 USTC 9569 (E.D. Va. 1974).
62 30 T.C. 741 (1958), acq. 59-361 (1959-2 C.B. 183).
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The Service, in acquiescing to Masser, established a two-part test.
It allows the proceeds from a sale to a private party under such cir-
cumstances to be treated as proceeds from an involuntary conversion
only if the taxpayer is able to show that the involuntarily converted
property can not reasonably or adequately be replaced and the existence
of a substantial economic relationship between the condemned property
and the other property, so that together they constitute one economic
unit. For example, if a portion of a shopping center is involuntarily
converted, the Service held in Letter Ruling 7842090, the sale of the
remaining portion could not be reinvested under Section 1033 because
the property converted could adequately be replaced, and the remainder
of the center could be used without the converted portion.
Similar or Related in Service and Use
To determine if property is similar or related in service and use,
two tests have generally been applied-"the end use" test and the "same
general class" test. The Tax Court, and for a considerable period of
time, the Service, applied a strict end use test, regardless of whether
the owner of the converted property used it himself or leased it to
others. This test requires a comparison of the physical characteristics
and the actual end uses of both properties and is often difficult to meet
in the case of owner-lessors. With the exception of the Third Circuit6 3
the appellate courts have reversed the Tax Court in the case of owner-
lessors, refusing to apply this test on the grounds that it was too strict
if the taxpayer was not actually using the property. 64 In such cases the
majority of the appellate courts tend to apply a test which requires a
determination of the similarities of the lessor's management activities
with respect to both properties. The Fourth Circuit applies a more liberal
test, however, requiring only that the converted and replacement proper-
ties be held for investment by the owners." Finally, in 1964 the Service
agreed with a majority of the appellate courts holding that in the case of
owner-lessors, the proper test is the similarity in the nature of the
owner's relation to the replacement property.66 Factors taken into ac-
count in applying this test include similarity in the extent and type of
the owner's management activity, the amount and kind of services ren-
dered to tenants and the nature of the business risks involved. In order
to avoid confusion of the tests for lessor-users with that for owner-users,
the Service has recently reminded taxpayers that for owner-users the
63 McCaflrey v. Comm'r, 275 F.2d 27 (3rd Cir. 1960), aff'g 31 T.C. 505
(1958).64 See, e.g., Liant Record, supra; Clifton Investment Co. v. U. S., 312 F.2d 719
(6th Cir. 1963); see also Filippini v. U. S., 318 F.2d 841, 63-2 USTC 9548
(9th Cir. 1963) affg 200 F.Supp. 286, 62-1 USTC 9144 (N.D. Cal. 1962)
(whether from all the circumstances the taxpayer continued his investment).65 Steuart Bros., Inc. v. Comm'r, 261 F.2d 580, 59-1 USTC 9143 (4th Cir.
1958), rev'g 29 T.C. 372 (1957).
66 Rev. Rul. 64-237, 1964-2 C.B. 319.
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end use of the converted property and the replacement property must
be similar.67
A taxpayer will be treated as having purchased qualifying property
or stock only if the adjusted basis of such property or stock is its cost
within the meaning of Section 1012. For example, the purchase of a
corporation's stock, which corporation pursuant to a prearranged plan
liquidates and distributes to the taxpayer assets comprising property
similar or related in service or use, is a qualifying replacement under
an extension of the Kimball Diamond rationale. Further, the acquisi-
tion of the remaining interest in a partnership owning property similar
to the involuntarily converted property, making the purchasing partner
the sole owner of such property, qualifies under Section 1033.68
For the Purpose of Replacing the Converted Property
Except under Section 1033(g), a taxpayer may acquire a controlling
interest in a corporation which owns qualifying property, provided the
corporation directly owns the replacement property. The statute appears
to require that the corporation own the replacement property on the
date of acquisition. In John Richard Corp.,69 however, the Tax Court
held that Section 1033 applied where the control of a corporation was
acquired notwithstanding the fact that the corporation did not own
the qualifying replacement property on the date of acquisition. Rather,
it subsequently obtained such replacement property. Although the
Service originally acquiesced, it withdrew its acquiescence explaining
in a later ruling ° that it believes the literal wording of Section
1033(a) (2) (A) requires that the corporation own property before
or at the time control is acquired.
Notwithstanding the express statutory requirement that property be
acquired for the "purpose" of replacing the converted property, courts
have tended to overlook a taxpayer's purpose. For example, in S. H.
Kress & Co. 7 1 the Tax Court held immaterial the fact that the taxpayer
would have purchased the replacement property even absent the
condemnation. In 1976, however, the Tax Court disallowed a replace-
ment for failure to meet the "purpose" requirements. In Frank G.
Templeton,7 2 the taxpayer transferred the proceeds of condemned real
estate to a controlled corporation pursuant to Section 351, whereupon
67 Rev. Rul. 77-192, 1977-1 C.B. 249.
6sSection 1033(a)(3)(A)(i) and (ii); Rev. Rul. 69-241, 1969-1 C.B. 200;
Rev. Rul. 70-144, 1970-1 C.B. 170, distinguishing Rev. Rul. 57-154, 1957-1 C.B.
262 Rev. Rul. 55-351, 1955-1 C.B. 343.
69 46 T.C. 41 (1966), nonacq. 1974-2 C.B. 5, withdrawing acq. 1967-1 C.B. 2.
70 Rev. Rul. 77-422, 1977-2 C.B. 307.
7140 T.C. 142 (1963); see also Smith & Wiggins Gin, Inc., 37 T.C. 861 (1962)
(replacement property had been ordered as part of overall program prior to
destruction or replacement property).
7267 T.C. 518 (1976), supplementing 66 T.C. 509 (1976).
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the corporation used a substantial portion of the funds received from
the taxpayer to purchase other real estate from the shareholder-tax-
payer. The net effect of the transaction was that the taxpayer had a
substantial portion of the money received from the condemnation.
Accordingly, the Tax Court held that he did not acquire the corporate
stock for the purpose of replacing the condemned property. The
Service also argued that the corporation did not own the qualifying
property on the date the shareholder-taxpayer acquired control.
Who May Make a Replacement
Generally, the replacement must be made by the owner of the con-
verted property. Thus, Section 1033 does not apply where property
is converted while owned by a corporation but replaced by its sole
shareholder out of assets distributed to him in complete liquidation.7 8
Likewise, although there is some authority to the contrary, a partner's
reinvestment of the proceeds of a conversion of partnership property
does not appear to qualify under Section 1033(a) .7 An acquiring
corporation in an asset acquisition under Section 381, however, may
make a qualified replacement in the place of the acquired corporation
as, apparently, may the new corporation in a consolidation."M
Perhaps the greatest area of controversy has arisen if the replacement
is made after the death of a person whose property was involuntarily
converted. The Service holds that the purchase or replacement of prop-
erty by a personal representative or heir of a deceased taxpayer whose
property was involuntarily converted during his lifetime, but who died
before replacing same, does not qualify.7 6 Courts have tended not
to agree with the Service, however, if the personal representative may
be considered to have been acting on behalf of the decedent. For
example, in the Estate of John E. Morris77 the Tax Court allowed
a reinvestment by a personal representative where the decedent had
designed and had substantially begun a plan of replacement and the
personal representative followed that plan in making a replacement.
The rationale in Morris was held to be inapplicable by the Tax Court
where a surviving spouse was found not to be acting on behalf of the
estate of her husband. Accordingly, the Court disallowed her replace-
ment under Section 1033; however, in so holding, it indicated that
73 Rev. Rul. 73-72, 1973-1 C.B. 29.74 Mihran Demirfian, 54 T.C. 1691, 1970, aff'd 457 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1972);
Rev. Rul. 66-191, 19,66-2 C.B. 300; Roy P. Varner, T.C. Memo 1973-27.
75§ 381(c)(13); § 1.381(c)(13)-1(a) to (e); Excelsior-Leader Laundry v.
Comm'r, 8 B.T.A. 183 (1927) (nonacq.).
76 Rev. Rul. 64-161, 1964-1 (Part I) C.B. 298.
7 55 T.C. 636 (1971); see Estate of Isaac Goodman, 199 F.2d 895, 522 USTC
9556 (3rd Cir. 1952); see also Rev. Rul. 70-376, 1970-2 C.B. 164 (the grantor
of a grantor trust may make a qualifying replacement following a conversion by
the trust); Rev. Rul. 58-407, 1958-2 C.B. 408 (beneficiary of a trust that termi-
nated after a conversion may make a qualifying replacement).
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the result might have been different had she purchased the replacement
property on behalf of the estate using funds of the estate.78
A different approach was taken recently by an Alabama District
Court. In Chichester v. United States7 9 the owner of property had
properly elected the provisions of Section 1033 following a conversion,
but the executor of his estate actually made the replacement when the
owner died prior to reinvesting the proceeds. The Court, noting that
the Section requires that the "taxpayer" suffering the conversion make
the reinvestment, held that "taxpayer" means the person subject to tax.
It determined that since the decedent's estate is subject to the tax at his
death, it becomes the taxpayer within the meaning of Section 1033 (a)
and may make a qualifying replacement.
Basis and Holding Period
The basis of property acquired as a result of involuntary conversion
is determined by reducing the cost of replacement property by the
gain not recognized on the conversion. The holding period rules of
Section 1031 are generally applied in Section 1033 transactions. Note
in this regard that the exchange of other like-kind property and cash
under Section 1031 for the purpose of replacing involuntarily con-
verted property is considered a purchase of replacement property to the
extent of the cash under Section 1033. 8o
Other Areas of Concern
If a taxpayer's property is involuntarily converted and he receives
a separately designated severance award for damage to the remaining
property, the award is considered to pertain to the remaining property
and is applied in reduction of its basis. The taxpayer will, of course,
recognize taxable gains to the extent the award exceeds the remaining
basis." In many cases, however, this results in severance damages
being received tax-free. Therefore, it is generally advantageous to have
as much of an award allocated to severance damages as possible.
Congress has recently legislatively reversed the Supreme Court. In
Central Tablet Manufacturing Co. v. United States,"2 the Court held
that Section 337 non-recognition of gain provisions do not apply to
receipts from an involuntary conversion by casualty occurring prior
to adoption of a plan of liquidation. Hence, unless the plan of liquida-
tion was adopted before an involuntary conversion, the taxpayer de-
siring to qualify under Section 337 had to use an alternative route.
7 8 Estate of George W. Jayne v. Comm'r, 61 T.C. 744 (1974).
7978-1 USTC 9458 (N.D. Ala. 1978).
80 Rev. Rul. 69-639, 1969-2 C.B. 161.
81 Rev. Rul. 68-37, 1968-1 C.B. 359.
82417 U.S. 673, 74-2 USTC 9511 (1974), aff'g 481 F.2d 954, 73-2 USTC
9545 (6th Cir. 1973).
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Under new Section 1033(f), 83 however, a corporate taxpayer has 60
days following an involuntary conversion in which to adopt a plan of
liquidation under Section 337. This provision is effective for involuntary
conversions occurring after November 10, 1978.
88 P.L. 95-628 (11/10/78).
